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04. CITIES
by Peter J. Taylor, Michael Hoyler, and Dennis Smith
Bringing in cities
The transition towards a modern world-system in the
“long sixteenth century” (c.1450-c.1650) can be interpreted
as a social transformation in the relations between
political ruling groups and commercial economic groups. In
previous world-systems, the two groups were definitively
separated and hierarchically ordered, with commerce cast
into a secondary mode. These previous systems are defined by
Wallerstein (1979) as world-empires. The modern world-system
is an interloper amongst these political worlds. It is based
upon a modus operandi between ruling and commercial groups
that Wallerstein calls a world-economy. In this system the
relative powers of the political and the economic groups are
more balanced. There is a recognized mutuality not found in
world-empires. This change is generally referred to as the
rise of mercantilism in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries – states embarking on commercial-economic policies
to augment their military-territorial policies.
Mercantilism came in many forms and can be measured in
terms of different balances between the economic and the
political. The United Provinces were located at one end of
this scale. This “merchant’s state” was based on “a high-
voltage urban economy” (Braudel 1984: 180) that created the
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“Dutch golden age” during what was for the rest of Europe
“the crisis of the seventeenth century.” With an
exceptionally high level of urbanization, this first modern
“economic miracle” developed a republican political
philosophy that lauded commercial activity and therefore
specifically valued the economic benefits of city networks.
This is clearly expressed in Pieter de la Court’s (1972) The
True Interests and Political Maxims of the Republic of
Holland, first published in 1662 as a guide for Holland’s
rulers. He interpreted Dutch cities as “intertwined one with
another” (p. 30) so that “together they formed,” according
to Braudel (1984: 180) “a power bloc.” One of de la Court’s
key maxims was that “the overthrow of great and prosperous
cities may be attributed to monarchs and princes of all
times but never to republics” (p. 4) so that “it follows
then to be the duty of the governors of republics to seek
for great cities, and to make them as populous and strong as
possible” (p. 5). Without acceding to the historical
veracity of the maxim, we can see that de la Court
recognized the production and productivity of cities as
central to Holland’s success and future, while casting rival
monarchical states - initially the modern ideological
successors of world-empires - as wasting the wealth created
by cities for the selfish “glory” of the king (Taylor 1999:
72). De la Court has been called “Adam Smith a century
before The Wealth of Nations” (Caton 1988: 233) but his
precocious focus on how growing cities generate new work (de
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la Court 1972: 57-59) makes him sound more like Jane Jacobs
three centuries before The Economy of Cities. We follow his
cities-centered political economy in this analysis.
We use the “urban cluster” concept of modern
scholarship to investigate the spatial polarization
represented by the core-periphery structure of the modern
world-system. The focus is on cities within the system and
how these are implicated in the development and reproduction
of this uneven economic development. Our approach has one
very important advantage. Estimates of the population size
of cities are available for all the times and spaces of the
modern world-system. This provides the opportunity to
generate comprehensive quantitative measurement of social
change and produce a customized comparative analysis of
cities. The beginning assumption is that a fast-growing city
is an economically successful city and therefore
demographics can chart this success across the time and
space horizons of the modern world-system.
We begin by describing our methodology for achieving
this aim. The demographics are extremely useful but require
careful interpretation to relate them to polarization. We
therefore follow this with a conceptual discussion of city
processes in core-making and consequent periphery-making.
Jumping forward from Pieter de la Court to recent
developments in urban theory, seven basic processes are
introduced to make sense of the geohistory of demographic
descriptions of city growths. Next we discuss the results of
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this exercise in terms of polarization versus convergence
over the long-term (i.e., the years 1500 to 2000).
Superficially the demographics appear to suggest an urban
convergence as the cities in non-core zones are growing into
“megacities” and rates of urbanization are catching up those
of the core. But our city processes indicate a much more
complex outcome unfolding. In a short conclusion our
findings are related to overall world-systems thinking.
Methodology: City demographic changes, 1500-2000
We offer here a basic summary of our methodology, which
is described and justified in detail in Taylor et al.
(2010). The purpose is to create an inventory of rapid city
population growths for the whole time and space of the
modern world-system. Certain arbitrary decisions were made
in order to achieve this in a manageable way. The results do
not necessarily include all such growth but do provide a
reasonably comprehensive and representative set of
successful cities in the system. For our purposes it is
especially important that a large number of cities are so
identified. We successfully produced an inventory of 342
cases of rapidly growing cities.
The steps taken towards this end were as follows:
1. We used de Vries (1984) for populations of European
cities to 1800 and Chandler (1987) both for non-
European cities before 1800 and for all cities after
55
1800 up to the most recent period for which we used
Brinkhoff (2007).
2. City populations were inspected for five century dates:
1600, 1700, 1800, 1900, and 2000.
3. In line with Wallerstein’s model of the expansion of
the modern world-system, cities were included just for
Europe and the Americas in 1600 and 1700. Indian,
Ottoman, and Russian cities were added from 1800
onwards. Chinese and Japanese and some other cities
were added from 1900 onwards.
4. Rosters of cities for these dates were produced by
averaging the population of the largest three cities
and then including all cities with 10% or more of this
average. This was to make the numbers of cities
comparable over time while also being manageable in
quantity. These five rosters are shown in the first
line of Table 1. The universe of cities in the study is
373.
5. Additional city populations of roster cities were then
collected for 1500 and half-century points: 1550, 1650,
1750, 1850, and 1950. Note that, following Wallerstein,
Indian, Ottoman, and Russian cities were included only
from 1750, and Chinese and Japanese cities from 1850.
6. Annualized rates of change over fifty-year intervals
were computed for each of the five rosters of cities.
For instance, using the 1600 roster, demographic
changes were found for 1500-1500 and 1550-1600. This
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provided 746 city growth measures in ten lists, one for
each fifty-year period.
7. All demographic changes of 1 percent per annum and
above were designated rapid-growth cities. These were
aggregated into century sums and shown in the second
line of Table 1. Note that a roster city may occur
twice as a rapid-growth city if it has growth above 1
percent per annum for both half centuries covered by
the roster (e.g., Birmingham in 1700-1750 and 1750-
1800). The result is an inventory of 342 rapid-growth
cities out of the total of 746 city growth measures.
This inventory is the empirical base of the remainder
of this analysis.
We can note the following in Table 1. The crisis of the
seventeenth century is clearly shown as the only downward
blip in the data. Otherwise there is a trend of increasing
numbers of cities over time indicating both intensive change
(new and more cities in existing land area) and extensive
change (incorporation of new land areas). The trend
accelerates immensely in the twentieth century. This feature
is especially reflected in the fourth row of Table 1, where
cities experiencing growth rates of over 5 percent per annum
are numbered. Such very-rapid-growth cities become numerous
only in the nineteenth century and become commonplace in the
twentieth century. This latter feature will be discussed in
some detail after we have the conceptual tools to interpret
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variations of what is happening amongst our inventory of 342
rapid-growth cities.
Cities in core-making and periphery-making
The specificity of Wallerstein’s (1979) core-periphery
thinking comes in two key ways. First, he treats core and
periphery as processes – core-making, periphery-making –
that are system-wide but that differ greatly in their
geographical concentrations. Hence there is the spatial
polarization into core zones and periphery zones. Second,
Wallerstein adds a new category, semi-periphery, which in
itself is not a process but rather a consequence of places
where the two opposing processes are relatively balanced. In
such circumstances particular states can harness core
processes in a drive to become part of the core zone. This
is the political mechanism for semi-peripheral states to
rise (or fall if the drive fails) in the spatial hierarchy
of the capitalist world-economy. This way of thinking can
privilege a territorial spatiality of the modern world-
system, what Castells (1996) calls spaces of places. By
focusing on cities we privilege a network spatiality of the
modern world-system, Castells’ spaces of flows. Through
using cities as a vehicle for understanding core-periphery
we hope to provide new insights into the changes in spatial
polarization of the modern world-system across its half-
millennium existence. We base our ideas on the seminal works
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of Jacobs (1969) and Castells (1996), who both interpret
cities as process.
How does this distinctive urban process relate to
Wallerstein’s “systemic process”? Introducing cities to
center stage in world-systems analysis is problematic
because Wallerstein (1984b) has created a tight, rigorous
argument building on classes, states, ethnicities (nations,
races), and households, with their associated political
movements.
There is no place for cities in this world-systems
analysis except as sites where events take place. Although
Wallerstein is sensitive to the importance of space in his
social processes (hence core-periphery), especially in
relation to time (what he calls TimeSpace), he gives no
recognition to the special places that are cities.
Urbanization is treated as an outcome of economic,
political, and cultural processes undermining the rural
world (Wallerstein 1984a). Although for most of the history
of the modern world-system such processes have generated
large numbers of important cities in core zones, with few or
no such cities in periphery zones, in Wallerstein’s argument
cities remain essentially inert. Core-making does not depend
on cities. His position contrasts with a growing urban
literature that interprets cities as the key generators of
economic change. As Jacobs (1969) tells it, cities are
themselves the fundamental process through which economies
expand. Let us briefly rehearse this argument. As a form of
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human settlement, cities exhibit several unique features.
Recently Ivan Turok (2009: 14) has presented these very
clearly and succinctly:
Cities are complex adaptive systems comprising
multitudes of actors, firms, and other organisations
forming diverse relationships and evolving together.
Frequent face-to-face contact and other cooperative and
competitive interactions enabled by proximity help to
increase people’s knowledge and skills, to improve
their capacity to respond creatively to economic
challenges, and to develop new and improved products,
processes and services. Other places cannot easily
replicate these conditions.
Accepting this position, we can add a further
dimension: cities are constituted as networks interlocked by
commerce and trade (Taylor 2004). Such linking creates an
incessant turnover of nonlocal actors who join in the
processes that Turok describes. The effectiveness of the
density of interactions he identifies is hugely enhanced by
the cosmopolitan nature of a city’s residents and visitors.
Thus the complexity of cities includes both internal links
(clusters/agglomeration) and external links
(networks/connectivity). It is this combination that makes
cities so special.
This special character – Jacobs’ city as process – that
is the prime mechanism of core-making. Jacobs (1969)
describes city process as a generic form, but we will argue
that it is given a specific momentum within the modern
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world-system (Taylor 2013). The operation of this process in
world-empires was evident but restricted by the precedence
given to political ruling groups. Making money could not
become a prime end in itself, only a means to other
(political) ends. But with the more balanced relation
between political and economic groups in the modern world-
system, restrictions on the commercial growth potentials of
cities were lessened in the development of a capitalist
world-economy, whose primary objective was the endless
accumulation of capital. Money had now become a prime end in
itself. This is what Pieter de la Court was grappling with
in his new understanding of Holland and what in the next two
centuries was to be expressed as the intimate relation
between urbanization and industrialization, the twin
processes of modernization.
The first major statistical comparison of modernity’s
unusually large cities was made by Adna Weber in his 1899
study of the growth of great nineteenth-century cities. The
study of the modern world-systems’ association with ever
larger cities continues today under conditions of economic
globalization in the analyses of global cities (Sassen 2001)
and world city networks (Taylor 2004). Cities are at the
economic cutting edge, continually reproducing the core zone
of the world-economy. We call this the dominant economic
process.
However Jacob’s economic process is not the only city-
formation mechanism in the modern world-system. In world-
11
11
empires the largest cities were where political power lay -
capital cities. Thus the three nonmodern cities that
unequivocally reached a population of at least a million
were centers of great world-empires with immense
redistributive powers: Imperial Rome, Caliphate Baghdad, and
Qing Beijing.
In the modern world-system this sovereign political
power is divided among polities in an interstate system
initially defined legally in the Treaty of Westphalia of
1648. This was the culmination of political centralizations
of the fragmented governance of medieval Europe in the
transition to the modern world-system. Capital cities of
these new territorial states attracted wealth and consequent
population to become large cities in their own right. We
shall call this continuing political importance in city-
making in the modern world-system the political privileging
process.
As centers of consumption, many large political cities
often developed important commercial functions, including
sizeable production to meet political and military needs.
This is an important category of the modern city related to
the mercantilism in the core that we shall label mixed
economic/political competitive process because it
encompasses roughly balanced political and economic city
functions in the interstate system.
There is another political economy process that modern
cities possess - the power to mold distant economic
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landscapes to their particular market demands. This is
described by Jacobs (1984) in her “five great forces” that
create simple dependent economies. She calls them “economic
grotesques.” These can come in different formats - from
plantation agriculture to provide sugar for European cities
to peasant agriculture to provide cocoa or coffee to
accompany the sugar in consumption. Other primary economic
sectors (resource regions - oil, ores), secondary economic
sectors (transplanted industry - the “new international
division of labor”), and tertiary sectors (back-office
services) can all form economic grotesques.
It is not what is produced that matters, but the
relation of these economic activities to the core cities.
The fluctuation of the demands of the core zone’s cities
controls the “success” of these fragile economies. There are
urban places that function to facilitate the transmission of
wealth production to the core, ports, and local political
centers, but these cities ultimately serve to replenish
cities in core zones, not the local economy. In world-
systems terms this is dependency theory. Andre Gunder
Frank’s (1969) “development of underdevelopment” process
links what he calls the “metropole” (core zone of cities) to
“satellites” (dependent facilitating places) through which
wealth is drained from the periphery. We call this the
dominant peripheral economic process. But there is an
additional process featuring capital cities of noncore
states that combines economic and political processes. Where
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states are instrumental in devising semi-peripheral
strategies (such as protectionism) this may lead to the
growth of a primate city structure with immense economic
centralization in the capital city. This mercantilism in the
periphery we call mixed economic/political development
process.
Finally, there are two city processes directly related
to the geographical expansion of the world-economy, one that
expands the periphery and one that expands the core. First,
some of the world-empires that have been incorporated into
the modern world-system themselves had thriving cities, both
political and economic. Therefore there has been an
inheritance by incorporation process whereby large cities
that grew outside the modern world-system become part of the
system. Many declined in the new circumstances (for
instance, resulting from Britain’s policy of de-
industrializing India in the nineteenth century) but others
prospered relatively (for instance, serving as the economic
impetus for some Chinese treaty ports).
Second, there has been European settlement that has
been able to reproduce itself in sparsely populated regions
on other continents. Belich (2009: 70) describes the most
successful example of this as the “settler revolution” of
Anglophones after about 1800 that manifested itself in two
movements - the expansion of the United States westward and
“Greater British” expansion in its Dominions, “the white un-
coerced part of the British Empire.” Further, he shows (p.
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85) that these Anglo expansions “grew at a staggering
demographic growth rate with economic growth to match.” By
1920 the American West had sixty-two million people and the
British Dominions had twenty-four million. Between them
their “white majorities were, on average, the richest
peoples in the world.” And these multiple expansions were
based upon numerous “boom cities” - the “precocious
sprouting … of nineteenth century settler cities” (p. 2).
This settler revolution was city-based, involving the “mass
transfer” of transportation technologies, financial
instruments, information, technical skills and knowledge,
and people so that Anglos were able “to reproduce … their
own society” in these new lands (p. 127). The result is a
“new form of settlement” that Belich calls “explosive
colonization” and describes as “human history’s most rapid
form of societal reproduction” (p. 183). We will call this
multiple creation of boom cities core frontier expansion
process. These seven city processes are summarized in Table
2 in their world-systems context.
The seven city-making processes within the modern
world-system account for the great rise in the sizes and
numbers of cities that typifies this system. In Table 3 we
have listed the three cities with the highest growth rates
for each of the ten fifty-year periods to illustrate the
processes through extreme cases of each. Thus there are
classic examples of each process. For instance, the list for
the early modern period (1500-1700) shows Antwerp, Augsburg,
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and Amsterdam as dominant core economic process; Potosí as
dominant peripheral economic process; Lisbon and London as
mixed core competitive; and Berlin and Dublin as political
privileging. The inherited by incorporation process is
represented by Lucknow, and the first example of mixed
peripheral development process is early Philadelphia. At the
end of the nineteenth century the two fastest-growing cities
are Chicago and Melbourne, coincidently the two cities
Belich (2009: 1-2) features at the beginning of his book to
illustrate his explosive colonization. This core frontier
expansion continues into the early twentieth century, when
it is replaced by the dominant peripheral economic process
in the final fifty-year period. But to understand such
trends comprehensively, we need to move on to considering
the whole inventory of 342 rapid-growth cities.
The increasing complexity of the core-periphery relation
In Table 4 the 342 examples of rapid-growth cities are
ordered by century and process. This summarizes the basic
quantitative findings of this research. To aid
interpretation, sums for core-making (dominant core
economic, mixed competitive, political privileging, and core
frontier expansion processes) and periphery-making
(inheritance by incorporation, dominant peripheral economic,
and mixed peripheral development processes) are presented.
Interpretation proceeds in two stages: first, overall
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patterns are described, and second, these are used to
address the question of polarization or convergence in the
core-periphery structure of the modern world-system. As will
be seen, this cities-based analysis does not provide a
simple answer to this question. Increasing complexity makes
this question intriguingly open.
The first point to make is that overall the half-
millennium trend in Table 4, as shown in rows 5 and 9, is
towards convergence between core-making and periphery-making
processes. In the early modern world-system (first two
centuries in Table 4), city growth is almost absent outside
the core zone. The two exceptions are Potosí with its silver
mountain and Mexico City with its colonial administrative
functions. The growth of noncore cities in the middle
century (1700-1800) is mainly due to inheriting cities from
the incorporation of India and the Ottoman and Russian
world-empires. This is a “geographically-mixed” category of
growth across pairs of world-systems, but it does inaugurate
the rise of cities in periphery-making in the modern world-
system. Both core-making and periphery-making increase
immensely in the nineteenth century. This feature is further
greatly accentuated in the twentieth century when periphery-
making city growth processes exceed core-making for the
first time, and by a large margin. Thus by the twentieth
century rapid growth cities are to be found across all zones
of the modern world-system. Given that the periphery zone
always constitutes a majority of the world-economy’s
17
17
population, we can say that the distribution of rapid growth
cities has come to reflect approximately the overall
demographic pattern of the world-system. Therefore at this
level of analysis, there can be no clearer example of core-
periphery convergence.
But the role of cities in the modern world-system is
not so simple. We can add to the analysis in both detail and
complexity. Taking the detail first, we can note the
interesting variations between the trends of the seven
processes individually. We have already mentioned the
inheritance by incorporation process. This occurs only in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when the modern
world-system experiences two major expansions.
In addition we can see that political processes in
core-making are concentrated in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. The seventeenth century is the only
time when dominant core economic processes do not constitute
a majority of core-making processes. The rise of Madrid as
the new capital of Castile/Spain and Berlin as the capital
of the rising power of Prussia are two classic examples of
political rapid-growth cities at this time.
However, in the last two centuries political processes
are overwhelmed by economic processes, with the seventy-five
cases of dominant economic peripheral processes in the
twentieth century being the outstanding feature. But there
are also forty-seven examples of mixed development process,
with cities like Buenos Aires and Mexico City as primate
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centers of powerful semi-peripheral states. In other words,
it is periphery-making city growth processes that dominated
the twentieth century, and with extremely large rates of
growth per annum.
In Table 5 we have extended the top three cities for
1950-2000 from Table 3 to show the top fifty rapid-growth
cities in this period. This confirms both the concentration
of these cities outside the core zone of the world-economy
and the very high growth rates. The only four cities in the
list that are from the core zone are all in the United
States (Phoenix, Miami, Dallas, and Atlanta) and reflect
bringing the southern United States into core status through
their cities in a variety of ways. But the really
interesting rapid-growth cities are the other forty-six in
poorer countries of the world. This represents a crescendo
of urbanization in the late modern world-system and requires
specific consideration.
The great advantage of thinking in terms of processes
is that we can handle the fact that there are always
multiple processes operating in the same place. Hence
process research can encompass complexities. We saw earlier
that Wallerstein used this facility to define semi-periphery
as coinciding core and periphery processes within states.
This situation is replicated in urban processes and cities.
Dominant core-making and periphery-making processes can and
do occur simultaneously as important components of
contemporary cities outside the core zone. For instance,
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Mumbai, Mexico City, Caracas, Johannesburg, and Bogotá
feature in the top fifty cities in terms of business
connectivity in the world city network in 2008, which is a
measure of dominant core economic process (Taylor et al.
2011). These cities are also listed by Davis (2006: 28) as
housing the “largest megaslums” in a list for 2005, the
epitome of peripheral city process.
These are two very different processes operating
simultaneously in these cities. In fact, this is typical of
cities beyond the core zone. Such cities are important
enough economically to be linked into the world city network
but are also burdened by great swaths of poverty. The latter
is the result of unprecedented levels of rural-urban
migration in the twentieth century as city-based core
processes have reorganized the global economic landscape for
their food and resource needs.
The resulting massive population growth rates
represented by Table 5 have produced this new category of
city commonly referred to as megacities. In poorer countries
these have two demographic components. Up to about a quarter
of the population is economically integrated into the world
city network and life is consumption-led just as it is for
all who make a living through dominant core economic
process. At the same time at least three-quarters of the
population lives in abject poverty, residents of Davis’s
megaslums. Therefore in a city like Mexico City its
population is unequally divided - about five million within
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core processes and twenty million in periphery processes.
Because of the former group, Mexico City is approximately as
important as Amsterdam and Zurich in the world city network
process (Taylor et al. 2011). Because of the latter group
Mexico City is very, very different from its core zone
network peers. This city as process is visibly semi-
peripheral in outcome. The idea of a growing multi-nodal
semi-periphery does not support our initial interpretation
of core-periphery convergence. Rather it seems that spatial
polarization is alive and well in the late modern world-
system, albeit packaged into a more complex geography.
Coming full circle
It is perhaps ironic that Wallerstein (1974) initially
derived part of his analysis of the modern world-system from
a series of Marxist debates, in one of which (that on the
transition from feudalism to capitalism) cities were the
main issue of contention. In the Dobb-Sweezy debate (Hilton
et al. 1978) the two positions were (1) that feudalism was
undermined by its own class contradictions and (2) that it
was undermined by the growth of bourgeois cities within.
Wallerstein comes down on the latter side because it
provides a broader systemic approach to the transition than
the more restricted national class interpretation. But he
does not fully embrace the importance of the role of cities
that we have traced from Pieter de la Court onwards.
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However, with the recent urbanization crescendo finally
making city dwellers the majority of humanity and with this
ongoing urbanization likely to lead to perhaps three-
quarters of the world living in cities later in the twenty-
first century, this emerging multi-nodal semi-periphery in
the modern world-system requires special attention.
There are two basic interpretations of the contemporary
megacity mix of core-making and periphery-making city
processes as they relate to material polarization or
convergence. For Mike Davis (2006), cities are sites of
increasing divergence. In his Planet of Slums he emphasizes
the despair of these grossly unequal cities and the future
potential instability of a new, disconnected, “informal
urban proletariat.” In contrast, for Robert Neuwirth (2006)
cities are sites of potential convergence. In his Shadow
Cities he emphasizes the social creativity of the megacity
residents in their struggles for survival. Dominant core
economic in practice but not in outcome due to the severe
constraints, cities remain places of opportunity in this
more optimistic account. This disagreement tells us that the
modern world-system is entering its demise through a newly
emerging urban politics of polarization and convergence in
cities in the semi-periphery. We are only beginning
sketchily to discern and understand this “urban revolution”
where, according to Brugmann (2009), both past core
proletariat and peripheral peasantry are being superseded as
the potential progressive agents of change by the global
22
22
urban dispossessed. One thing that is certain is that this
great wave of urbanization, concentrating billions of people
in close proximities, is creating ever more complex world-
making processes of powers, flows, legitimacies, entwinings,
and creativities. Amongst the turmoil of polarizations and
convergences there exists a possibility for a new
progressive politics through cities, as promoted by Pilon
(2010: 5): “It is not only the right to urban resources, it
is the right to change ourselves by changing the city: the
kind of city we have is linked to the kind of human beings
we are willing to be.” This means moving the focus of
progressive urban politics from promoting inclusion
(extending current ways of living) towards transition to new
ways of living together.
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Table 1 Cities included in the study over time
Classifications of
cities
1500-
1600
1600-
1700
1700-
1800
1800-
1900
1900-
2000
Total
City rosters for
each century
72 39 60 49 153 373
City change
measures for each
half century
144 78 120 98 306 746
Of which: Sum of
rapid-growth
cities for each
half century
29 16 30 70 197 342
Of which: Cities
with growth rates
above 5% per annum
0 2 6 30 161 199
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Table 2 City processes in producing and reproducing the
capitalist world-economy
City processes World-system process
A. Dominant core economic
B. Dominant peripheral
economic
These are the two basic
processes that have
produced and reproduced the
capitalist world-economy as
a core-periphery structure,
with commercial metropoles
in the core (A) and
dependent urban
facilitators in the
periphery (B).
C. Political privileging
D. Mixed core competitive
E. Mixed peripheral
development
Early state centralization
created important capital
cities as centers of
political power in the core
(C). This was sometimes
mixed with basic commercial
functions, producing a
balance of political and
economic power that has
become increasingly common
(D). More recently this mix
has developed outside the
core, where state
centralization is integral
to a semi-peripheral
development strategy (E).
F. Inheritance by
incorporation
G. Core frontier expansion
These are two historically
specific processes. Where
the capitalist world-
economy expanded into city-
rich empires, successful
cities were initially
incorporated (F). In
contrast, where the
capitalist world-economy
expanded into territories
devoid of cities, large-
scale urban settlement
created frontier cities
(G).
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Table 3 Fastest growing cities and their city processes
City Period Percent
change
per
annum
City process
Lisbon
Seville
Antwerp
Augsburg
1500-
1550
4.53
3.20
2.50
2.50
Mixed core competitive
Dominant core economic
Dominant core economic
Dominant core economic
Potosí
London
Rome
1550-
1600
3.24
3.00
2.67
Dominant peripheral economic
Mixed core competitive
Political privileging
Dublin
Amsterdam
Leiden
1600-
1650
4.80
3.38
3.36
Political privileging
Dominant core economic
Dominant core economic
Berlin
Dublin
Copenhagen
1650-
1700
7.17
5.06
4.09
Political privileging
Political privileging
Mixed core competitive
Liverpool
Birmingham
Cadiz
1700-
1750
5.33
4.86
3.22
Dominant core economic
Dominant core economic
Mixed core competitive
Lucknow
Manchester
Philadelphia
1750-
1800
7.60
5.78
5.19
Inheritance by incorporation
Dominant core economic
Mixed peripheral development
New York
Baltimore
Philadelphia
1800-
1850
18.48
11.00
10.53
Dominant core economic
Dominant core economic
Dominant core economic
Chicago
Melbourne
Buenos Aires
1850-
1900
120.64
25.71
19.78
Core frontier expansion
Core frontier expansion
Mixed peripheral development
Los Angeles
Houston
Jakarta
1900-
1950
72.50
29.82
23.25
Core frontier expansion
Core frontier expansion
Mixed peripheral development
Lagos
Dacca
Khartoum
1950-
2000
69.98
52.83
43.78
Dominant peripheral economic
Dominant peripheral economic
Dominant peripheral economic
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Table 4 City growth processes, 1500-2000
City growth process 1500-
1600
1600-
1700
1700-
1800
1800-
1900
1900-
2000
Dominant core economic
process
Political privileging
process
Mixed economic/political
competitive process
Core frontier expansion
process
16
4
7
0
7
6
3
0
12
9
1
0
30
4
15
4
54
0
17
4
Total core-making 27 16 22 53 75
Dominant peripheral
economic process
Mixed economic/political
development process
Inheritance by
incorporation
1
1
0
0
0
0
2
1
5
5
8
4
75
47
0
Total periphery-making 2 0 8 17 122
Total demographic expansion 29 16 30 70 197
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Table 5 The top 50 rapid-growth cities, 1950-2000
Rapid-growth
cities
Population change
per annum
Lagos 69.98%
Dacca 52.83%
Khartoum 43.78%
Kinshasa 41.32%
Phoenix 33.54%
Surat 29.43%
Fortaleza 28.84%
Chittagong 28.53%
Belo Horizonte 28.09%
Delhi 27.13%
Karachi 26.13%
Shantou 24.94%
Seoul 24.73%
Taipei 24.37%
Bogotá 23.25%
Ankara 22.02%
Medellín 22.00%
Lahore 21.49%
Rawalpindi 20.84%
Kabul 20.79%
Izmir 20.08%
Tehran 19.71%
Miami 19.51%
Monterrey 19.32%
Dallas 19.24%
Guadalajara 18.95%
Istanbul 18.25%
Porto Alegre 17.89%
Manila 17.79%
Atlanta 17.28%
Baghdad 17.18%
Jaipur 16.95%
Cali 16.92%
Kaohsiung 16.90%
Jakarta 16.49%
Taiyuan 16.37%
Bangalore 16.03%
Poona 15.88%
Algiers 15.69%
Guangzhou 15.47%
Medan 15.46%
Tel Aviv-Jaffa 15.32%
Addis Ababa 14.98%
São Paulo 14.47%
Pyongyang 14.36%
Lima 13.93%
Bangkok 13.81%
Damascus 13.43%
Chengdu 13.02%
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Ibadan 12.64%
